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THE SUTHERLAND REPORT AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MARK L. MOVSESIAN*
Ten years after the organization's founding, an air of disappointment sur-
rounds the WTO. The great promise of a global trade regime, dedicated to
the principle of comparative advantage, seems to have stalled. The Doha
Development Round, launched in 2001 in an attempt to redeem the disastrous
Seattle Ministerial Conference of 1999, has been stymied by familiar disputes
between North and South, mostly with respect to agricultural issues, but with
respect to nonagricultural market access and services as well. Frustrated by
impasses at the WTO, members have increasingly bypassed the organization
in favor of discrete "preferential trade agreements", or PTAs, that address trade
issues in regional and sub-regional units. According to critics, these PTAs are
creating a " spaghetti bowl" of trade regimes that threatens to make the global
organization irrelevant.
The dissatisfaction extends even to dispute settlement, long seen as the
WTO's major contribution to international law. Although the DSU has had some
notable successes, particularly in comparison to the often desultory GATT dis-
pute settlement mechanism, commentators have voiced concerns. For example,
one hears complaints that the retaliation remedy is too lenient, particularly in
the context of asymmetric disputes between large and small economies;' there
are proposals to cure this problem by allowing for monetary compensation as
a remedy.2 Commentators denounce the idea that members can violate their
treaty obligations indefinitely - that members have the option to "breach" or
to "buy out" their victims by accepting retaliation.3 Still others argue that the
Professor of Law, Hofstra University.
J. Pauwelyn, "Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules
Toward a More Collective Approach", 94 American Journal of International Law (2000),
pp. 335.338.
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als).
3 J.H. Jackson, "International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation
to Comply or Option to 'Buy Out'?", 98 American Journal of International Law (2004),
p. 109. For an argument in favor of the buy-out option, see WE Schwartz & A.O. Sykes,
202 Mark L. Movsesian
Appellate Body should be more willing to supplement WTO treaty text with
other substantive international law, including customary international law.'
The Sutherland Report - more properly, the Report by the Consultative
Board on The Future of the WTO - reflects this sense of unease about the
organization's apparent drift.' While affirming that the WTO represents "the
most dramatic advance in multilateralism" since the 1940s,' the Report wonies
that the organization "is not by any means fully equipped" for the tasks ahead. 7
To remedy this situation, the Report makes numerous recommendations in
a wide variety of areas. The language is moderate in tone and the proposals
mostly moderate in scope; the authors clearly understood the dangers of a
radical transformation of the organization. And, as one would expect in a work
done by committee, there are some tensions in the Report; its endorsement of
plurilateral negotiations, for example, seems a bit at odds with its condemnation
of PTAs. But one can fairly say that several important elements of the Report
tend in the direction of strengthening the WTO as an institution, of making it
a more independent and less "Member-driven" body.
Reaction within the WTO membership has been tepid. There is little chance
that the General Council will consider the Report before the end of the Doha
Round, which could mean indefinite postponement. This lack of enthusiasm is
not all that surprising. Enhancing the rigor of the WTO as an institution seems
unlikely to solidify members' commitment to the organization. On the contrary,
increasing the demands of WTO membership - for example, by enlarging the
organization's scope and making its rulings more binding - seems more likely,
at this point, to result in greater suspicion and resistance. Empowering the WTO
in some of the ways that the Report suggests could actually retard, rather than
advance, the cause of freer global trade.
"The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade
Organization", 31 Journal of Legal Studies (2002), p. 179.
J. Pauwelyn, "Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe
of Inter-Connected Islands", 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004), pp. 903,
909-15.
5 Consultative Board to the Director-General, "The Future of the WTO", 2004 [hereinafter
Report].
6 Ibid., p. 9.
7 Ibid., p. 5 (Sutherland Preface).
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The Report is quite comprehensive - addressing matters as diverse as PTAs
(the Report expresses concern about their spread), the desirability of plurilateral
negotiations within the WTO (the Report argues they should be considered as a
way of avoiding impasses), and relations with civil society and other intergov-
ernmental organizations (the Report supports some greater transparency) - and
it is impossible to conduct a thorough review in a short essay. Nonetheless, the
Repoi t's discussion of one important area, dispute settlement, demonstrates my
point. The Report argues, conectly, that the dispute settlement mechanism has
been a "remarkable success", noting that the rate of cases submitted far exceeds
that under the old GATT regime and highlighting the increased participation
of developing countries.' It urges caution with respect to "dramatic changes".9
Indeed, the Report's proposals are mostly small-bore suggestions for things
like somewhat greater transparency and the possibility of remands fiom the
Appellate Body to panels.
But other important elements of the Report hint at a more rigorous role for
WTO dispute settlement. For example, with respect to compliance, the Report
vehemently rejects the idea that members have a buy-out option. While "not
100% explicitly clear in the DSU language", the Report argues that the better
reading of WTO documents is that members must comply with adverse rulings
by changing their laws. The Report points out the practical problem with al-
lowing members to "'buy out' of their obligations by... enduring" retaliation
indefinitely: Retaliation from a much poorer country is unlikely to have an effect
significant enough to cause a richer member to alter its WTO-illegal practices. 0
The Report maintains, cautiously, that "[s]ome experimentation" with monetary
compensation as a remedy "could be useful" in these circumstances." Finally,
the Report expresses frustration with the fact that some nations require legisla-
tion, as opposed to executive action, to implement WTO rulings. The need for
legislation can delay compliance; the Report argues "that governments which
have this problem need to seriously consider institutional changes in execu-
tive-legislative relationships to avoid this risk."12
The Report's discussions of "gap filling" by WTO tribunals also hint at a
more expansive role for dispute settlement. While at one point the Report notes
8 Ibid., p. 50.
9 Ibid., p. 49.
10 Ibid.
Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 55.
204 Mark L. Movsesian
simply that the use of general international law to supplement WTO treaties is a
controversy that needs further elaboration,13 at others it suggests pretty clearly
that the controversy should be resolved in favor of gap filling. Gap filling,
the Report maintains, is an inescapable part of any juridical mechanism. 14 It
recommends that the Secretariat take steps to educate members that "a certain
amount of limited gap-filling" along with "the resolution of ambiguities" and
"the need for various interpretation techniques are all part of the natural scenery
of dispute settlement.""5
Members are likely to resist these suggestions for more rigorous dispute
settlement, and not simply because of obstinacy or interest-group capture. For
example, it might well be valuable for all concerned to preserve some ambiguity
about the buy-out option. While the risks that the Report describes with respect
to asymmetric disputes do exist, one can fairly ask whether the Report exagger-
ates the dangers. The rate of compliance with rulings has been remarkably good
so far 16 there apparently have been few cases in which members have attempted
to buy out injured parties while refusing to comply with adverse rulings for a
long period of time. Definitively eliminating the buy-out option might be an
example of a theoretical solution in search of a real-world problem.
Moreover, the buy-out option can serve as a useful check against the
potential for overreaching by the WTO. At the moment, the WTO has a fairly
narrow trade compass, and the threat to representative democracy in member
states is slight. But there are persistent calls for the WTO to take on more in
the way of substantive regulatory authority 17 Indeed, at times the Report itself
seems to support those calls. While noting the legitimate claims of subsidiarity,
the Report nonetheless argues that coordination benefits and market failures,
like externalities, might well justify transforming the WTO into "essentially an
international economic regulatory level of government", at least with respect
to certain issues.1 The Report does not identify precisely which issues these
13 Ibid., p. 52.
14 Ibid., p. 55.
15 Ibid., p. 58.
16 D. McRae, "What is the Future of WTO Dispute Settlement", 7 Journal of International
Economic Law (2004), pp. 3. 5.
17 See, e.g., A.T. Guzman, "Global Governance and the WTO", 45 Harvard International
Law Journal (2004), p. 303.
18 Report at p. 34.
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would be, though it does hint that environmental issues that pose the risk of
"races to the bottom" are a likely category.19
If the WTO were to expand into substantive regulatory areas like envi-
ronmental protection, the potential for interference with sensitive domestic
legislation would be significantly greater than exists today. Nations often
have different interests and values in such areas that justify different regula-
tory regimes; developing countries, in particular, complain that developed
countries fail to give appropriate consideration to the difficult conditions they
face. Members, including developing countries, might find it useful to retain
the ability to enforce sensitive domestic legislation in the event that the WTO
oversteps its bounds. Indeed, in a sensitive case, the claim that an offending
nation would have to change its law in response to a WTO ruling could lead
to a nationalist backlash that would cause the member to reconsider its WTO
commitment altogether - especially if, as the Report suggests, the WTO were
also to call on the member to reanange constitutional relations between execu-
tive and legislative branches in order to avoid delays in compliance with the
organization's rulings.
Experimentation with monetary compensation as a remedy seems similarly
ill advised. Even assuming that the buy-out strategy is as much a real-world
concern as the Report suggests, a monetary-compensation scheme would not
really solve the problem. Members could buy out an injured party by paying a
fine just as easily as they could by accepting retaliation - a fact that the Report,
to its credit, concedes.2' Indeed, assuming that the fine really were compensatory
in nature, i.e., limited to the amount of the injured party's loss, a monetary-
compensation regime would not be all that different from the present one. As
it is, the DSU provides that retaliation must be limited to an amount equivalent
to the loss that the offending measure has caused the complaining member."1
(There are occasionally proposals for retroactive monetary-compensation
schemes, which would be very different fiom the current remedies system, but
the Report does not take an express position on those proposals)."
A monetary-compensation regime would also eliminate one of the great
advantages of the retaliation remedy in securing compliance with WTO rulings.
19 See ibid., p. 32.
'0 See ibid., p. 54.
'1 DSU art. 22.4.
'2 See A. Porges, "Settling WTO Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?", 19 Ohio
State Journal on Dispute Resolution (2003), pp. 141. 177-78 (discussing proposals).
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As I argue in detail elsewhere, the retaliation remedy works by harnessing an
important domestic interest group. By imposing burdens on the pioducts of
a nation that adopts a protectionist measure, retaliation creates incentives for
exporters in that nation to lobby for the removal of the measure. The exporters
can, over time, counter the influence of the interest groups that lobby for the
protectionist measure. The retaliation remedy thus promotes compliance fiom
within, without directly imposing demands from an international body that
nationalist groups could use to rally opposition to global fiee trade norms.
A monetary-compensation regime, by contrast, would do nothing to
motivate exporters to lobby against a protectionist measure. Presunably, the
money for the fine would simply be appropriated fiom the national treasury,
meaning that the cost would ultimately be borne by the nation's taxpayers as
a whole - the very people who, as consumers, are already bearing the burden
of the protectionist measure in question.' As the insights of public choice
theory suggest, the fine would likely do little to induce these people to lobby
for the measure's removal."5 Because the effect on individual taxpayers would
be relatively small, the fine would do little to mobilize collective opposition.
Moreover, as a punishment imposed directly by an international body, a fine
could be a symbolic rallying point for resistance to the idea of the WTO more
broadly.
Finally, the Report's insouciance with regard to substantive gap filling by
WTO tribunals also gives cause for concern. As a purely legal matter, it is very
doubtful that tribunals have authority to supplement WTO treaty provisions with
other sources of international law. The DSU does seem to contemplate that, in
"clarify [ing]" WTO agreements, tribunals will resort to the "customary rules
of interpretation of public international law.' ' 26 But that is as far as it goes: the
DSU does not provide for the application of substantive international-law rules
not found in WIO agreements. Indeed, the DSU indicates that tribunals "cannot
'3 M.L. Movsesian, "Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis", 32
Hofstra Law Review (2003), p. 1.
'4 See J. Nzelibe, "The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in
the World Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Mechanism", 6 Theoretical Inquiries
in Law (Online Edition), (2005), at <www.bepress.coin til/defaultivol6/iss /art7>.
For a fuller discussion of this point, see J.0. McGinnis & M.L. Movsesian, "The World
Trade Constitution", 114 Harvard Law Review (2000), pp. 511, 523-24.
26 DSU art. 3.2.
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add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in" WTO treaties,7 and
the WTO Charter provides that only the Ministerial Conference and General
Council have authority to adopt interpretations of WTO treaties, on a three-
fourths vote. 8 Clearly, the drafters of the WTO agreements desired to limit the
capacity of tribunals to stray beyond treaty text when resolving disputes.
The drafters were right to limit tribunals' discretion in this way. Allowing
WTO adjudicators to engage in substantive gap filling would present serious
practical dangers. The rules of international law, especially the rules of custom-
ary international law, are frequently quite malleable. Because they typically are
drawn up without an eye to juridical enforcement, in the WTO or elsewhere,
such rules are often open-ended, even hortatory, in nature. Increasingly, they
address regulatory areas traditionally seen as the prerogatives of nation states,
including environmental protection, labor, and public health. It thus would
be easy for tribunals engaged in gap filling to use international-law rules as
vehicles to impose the tribunals' own views on nations' substantive regulatory
policies, including in sensitive areas of domestic concern. In such a regime,
WTO members could find themselves bound to substantive obligations to which
they never consented, either in the organization or anywhere else. z9
The possibility of unpredictable regulatory obligations that touch on impor-
tant national interests would hardly be a reason for members to increase their
commitment to the WTO. Indeed, enlarging the scope of tribunals' discretion
in this way could well lead members to look outside the organization when
making trade agreements - the very sort of thing that other sections of the
Report condemn. Developing countries, in particular, would have reason to be
suspicious of a gap-filling regime. These countries generally lack the litigating
resources that developed countries possess to present their case.3" Moreover,
they have less representation among the experts who comprise WTO tribunals;
these experts, with predominantly Western backgrounds, or at least Western
training, can be expected to have predominantly Western views on the proper
'7 DSU art. 3.2.
'8 WTO Charter art. IX.2.
29 J.0. McGinnis, "The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary
International Law: The Example of the WTO", 44 Virginia Journal of International Law
(2003), pp. 229, 252.
30 J.0. McGinnis & M.L. Movsesian, "Against Global Governance in the WTO", 45
Harvard International Law Journal (2004), pp. 353, 362.
208 Mark L. Movsesian
accommodation between trade and non-trade values.31 Developing countries
could easily perceive an adjudicatory system stacked against them - one that
would fill gaps in ways that would systematically slight their interests - and
decline to participate. Expanding tribunals' discretion in the way the Report
suggests thus could work against one of the WTO's central goals: extending
the benefits of fieer trade to those countries that need them most.
While the Sutherland Report does not contemplate an immediate transforma-
tion of the WTO, significant elements of the Report, including the ones I have
described here, do hint at further aggrandizement of the organization. Yet
there is a real irony in the notion that we can rescue the WTO by making it
more powerful as an institution. Enlarging the scope of the WTO could easily
backfire, thereby jeopardizing the substantial contributions that the organization
has made, and continues to make, to the cause of global trade. It is worthwhile
to remember that the breakthrough of the Uruguay Round came only after a
couple of generations' experience with GATT. It may be that we will have to
wait a while - more than ten years, anyway - before nations are ready for the
next big step in multilateral trade negotiations. In the meantime, the WTO can
continue its useful work of policing protectionism and providing a forum for
the reduction of tariffs around the world.
IOLR 200-5
31 Ibid., p. 363.
